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Abstract—One of the main tasks of cybersecurity is recognizing
malicious interactions with an arbitrary system. Currently, the
logging information from each interaction can be collected
in almost unrestricted amounts, but identification of attacks
requires a lot of effort and time of security experts. We propose an
approach for identifying fraud activity through modeling normal
behavior in interactions with a system via machine learning
methods, in particular LSTM neural networks. In order to enrich
the modeling with system specific knowledge, we propose to use
an interactive visual interface that allows security experts to
identify semantically meaningful clusters of interactions. These
clusters incorporate domain knowledge and lead to more precise
behavior modeling via informed machine learning. We evaluate
the proposed approach on a dataset containing logs of inter-
actions with an administrative interface of login and security
server. Our empirical results indicate that the informed modeling
is capable of capturing normal behavior, which can then be used
to detect abnormal behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we consider the context of a system misuses
identification. We assume that the system allows for a fixed set
of actions, e.g., system calls in any operating system or actions
like ’SearchItem’, ’FilterResults’ in any online shop. Logs of
interactions with a system can be used as data for training
automated security models for protecting it from intrusions.
Usually, the analysis of logs is performed manually by security
specialists, since the usage of automated methods is prone to
many possible problems. One of the prominent ones is the
regulation of false alarms–usually it is hard to generalize for
detection of unseen attacks because they are mostly mimick-
ing normal behavior [1]. Even more, intrusion detection is
considered to be a hard task for automated methods because
of particular challenges in the field [1]:
• semantic gap between the predictions and interpretable
information makes it hard to use the model outputs by
security experts;
• modeling normal traffic without becoming too vague is
a challenge due to the diversity of network traffic to be
analyzed;
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• evaluation schemes are frequently not capable of captur-
ing true properties of a model.
Nevertheless, novel machine learning approaches are
promising to achieve good results on the task of intrusion
detection. In particular, classical approaches were applied, e.g.,
SVMs and decision trees; artificial neural networks were also
considered in more recent works [2]. There exist two main
classes of intrusion detection approaches:
1) based on the known attack schemes and their recognition
in system interactions;
2) based on anomaly detection via learning normal behav-
ior in the system and finding outlying behavior.
The first class of approaches is the most precise methods
for detecting existing attacks if the application environment
is restricted to a specific system with known vulnerabilities.
The main problem with such methods is a need of constant
support of the databases containing attack signatures. The
more popular class for applying machine learning methods is
the second one, requiring generalization to unseen cases and
allowing more freedom in application systems.
Since machine learning approaches are more suitable for
learning previously seen normal behavior than recognizing
unseen malicious ones [1], a promising technique is to learn
behavioral patterns from the activity in the system in a
continuous way. Then a fraud can be detected as an outlier
by monitoring the current activities using learned models for
normal behavior. The main challenge in such application is the
variety of possible activities that requires very thorough and
long observation of the system interactions. The proposed so-
lution is to subdivide the activities according to some criterion.
For example, Chandrasekhar and Raghuveer [3] employed
fuzzy clustering to separate data into homogeneous subsets
and learn separate artificial neural networks for each of the
subsets for further predictions. The best option for consistency
of modeled behaviors is to subdivide activities according to
semantically meaningful properties which requires domain and
system specific knowledge.
The importance of target systems understanding in such
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specific domain is quite high [1]. It is critical for the detection
of known attacks, but can also be used for validating and
evaluating normal behavior and discovering anomalies through
it. This leads to a necessity of informed machine learning
techniques. For example, Meng et al. [4] involved experts
knowledge in the loop for recognizing the most successful
models for reducing the amount of false alarms, at the same
time keeping the level of accuracy high.
Overall, Xin et al. [2] in their survey indicate that machine
learning and deep learning approaches can be quite success-
fully applied in cybersecurity and show high performance.
The most successful models are recurrent neural networks, in
particular Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks [5].
In this paper we consider the task of identifying misuses
of an administrative interface of an internal portal. The use
case is identified during the DiSIEM project1. Because of
the severity of the actions inside the portal it is crucial for
operators to identify misuses, e.g., sessions indicating abuse
of personal information, such as deleting (’ActionDeleteUser’)
or resetting access (’ActionResetPwdUnlock’) of multiple user
profiles [6]. To allow monitoring, the interactions are logged
as sessions containing sequences of actions. The security
operators regularly check all the activity in order to identify
possibly malicious behavior. The recorded dataset consists of
the recorded activities of normal behavior and thus, the main
task is to model such normal behavior. Automated identifica-
tion of normality will reduce operators work by allowing them
to only investigate suspicious interactions. We propose using
LSTM-based language models for learning normal behavior
for clusters of interactions identified through a visual system
by security experts. All new interactions will be monitored
in realtime to identify how much they are aligned with the
modeled normal behavior.
The paper is organized in the following parts: first we
provide related work, then describe our approach, afterwards
we show the results of its evaluation, and conclude with a
discussion and future work.
II. RELATED WORK
As it was already mentioned, the suitable usage of machine
learning techniques in recognizing cybersecurity attacks hav-
ing logged interaction sessions is to try to learn known normal
behavior. Also behavioral patterns are shown to be an im-
portant insight into understanding the possibilities of attacks,
especially when it is internal usage of a system [7, 8, 9].
Previously multiple approaches for identifying anomalies in
interaction sessions were proposed: based on such handcrafted
features as length of the session, character distribution in the
session, etc. [10, 11]
Behavior inside of a system usually can be described by
sequences of particular actions that are happening during the
interaction. There are several approaches in machine learning
for modeling sequential data, e.g. Hidden Markov Models
[12]. Here we apply recurrent neural networks, that were
1http://www.disiem-project.eu/
also employed in cybersecurity tasks [13]. Recurrent Neural
Networks (RNNs) [14] are a class of artificial neural network
where neurons are stacked in a recursive manner. This allows
the network to memorize things from the past by feeding them
back to itself. Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [15] is one
of the prominent RNN models and has been shown to be
capable of avoiding some of the problems which arise during
the training of Recurrent Neural Networks.
One of the ways to perform the sequential analysis of
interaction sessions is using the tools developed in the field
of natural language processing [5, 16, 17]. RNNs, especially
LSTMs, are widely used for language modeling [18, 19, 20].
The use of RNNs for language modeling dates back to 2003
[18], and still today some of the recent language models use
RNN based networks to produce state-of-the-art results. For
example, the LSTM architecture proposed by Wu et al. [21]
produces state-of-the-art results for Neural Machine Transla-
tion based on language modeling.
Applying language models to model users behavior in form
of sequences of actions is a straightforward idea since the task
of a language model is to predict the next word in a sequence
and it is usually trained on a vast amount of unlabeled data.
Neural language models are language models that utilize the
neural network properties to predict the probability of the next
word in a sequence [22]. In our case, such kind of neural
language model is modified, the sequence of user actions is
considered to be the sequence of words, thus enabling to model
the probability distribution over user actions sequence space.
Language modeling was already employed in the network
security community. Tuor et al. [17] applied character level
language modeling for separate lines of logging files in or-
der to identify fraudulent actions. This approach was shown
to perform good on one of the publicly available datasets,
nevertheless it is rather sensitive to the format of logging
information, e.g., having information about the IP address
of the request and success of the performed action. It also
does not employ the information of the sequences of actions
performed in each interaction. Another technique by Kim et al.
[5] employs an ensemble of language models that are learning
normal users’ behavior from sequences of actions. According
to Xin et al. [2] their approach is one of the most successful
in solving the task for one of the publicly available datasets.
Nevertheless, even though both Tuor et al. [17] and Kim
et al. [5] mention the need of separate modeling for particular
groups of behaviors, they cover this idea either by ensemble of
different models or by specifying the timespan of the sessions
to model. A natural way in the context of modeling users’
behavior is to cluster sequences based on the user profile.
But this information is not always available and might not
even exist in some applications, e.g., peer-to-peer interaction
where various users might be in control of the node. Moreover,
behavioral modeling with recurrent neural networks can be
applied in various tasks, e.g. identifying behavior of malware
files [23], and binding the approach to users’ profiles is a
restriction. As it was mentioned by Sommer and Paxson [1]
understanding of the exact system and types of interactions
is very critical in cybersecurity tasks. For example, Chan-
drasekhar and Raghuveer [3] achieved good results by having
an expert in the loop. Based on this, we propose to integrate an
interactive visual tool [24] for incorporating security experts
knowledge about the system. Using a visual interface the
experts can separate sequences of interactions to meaningful
clusters. The core idea of the solution is to perform multiple
runs of LDA topic modeling [25], treating each session s as a
document composed of words–actions ai. We run LDA with
different parameters, e.g. number of topics, multiple times and
get the ensemble of LDA. We use the topics and two matrices
(the topic-action matrix and the document-topic matrix) as the
input for the visualization system.
An exemplary view of the visual interface is shown in
Figure 1. It consists of three main parts: topic projection
view (top left), topic-action matrix (right) and a topic chord
diagram (bottom left). Topic projection view employs the t-
SNE technique to visualize the similarity of different topics.
It also allows the experts to select or brush the clusters of
topics in order to examine the details in the other views. The
topic-action matrix view visualizes the probability distribution
of actions in each of the topics. The x-axis represents actions
and the y-axis represents topics. The higher the opacity of the
matrix block, the higher the probability that the action appears
in the specific topic. The chord visualization represents the
selected topics relationship. The outer fans represent topics,
the length of each indicates the number of actions belonging
to it. The more actions two topics share, the thicker the links
connecting corresponding fans. It is used to indicate how
similar topics are.
Fig. 1. Exemplary view of the visual interface for the security experts for
understanding the distribution of actions and exploring created clusters [24].
The result of visual analytics is presented in a form of sets
of sessions, so it does not provide an inference technique
for a new sequence of actions [24]. We have to define a
method recognizing the cluster to which the sequence is related
the most. There are various approaches for performing this,
e.g., simply finding the closest mean to a new sequence or
K nearest neighbors. We preferred an approach that allows
generalization and comparatively fast prediction–one class
support vector machine (OC-SVM) [26]. OC-SVMs are widely
used for anomaly detection and were also applied for intrusion
detection [16, 27]. We employ them only for detecting the
corresponding cluster for a new session.
In the next section we describe our approach in more details.
III. APPROACH
Overall, the envisioned pipeline of the approach can be
summarized as a diagram depicted in Figure 2. In the following
we describe separate parts in more details.
Fig. 2. Diagram of the proposed approach. The training phase can be repeated
at any moment if security experts notice sufficient drift in behavior in the
system.
A system is identified by a set of d ∈ N possible actions
A. Each user interacts with the system using the actions in
A. These interactions can be separated into sessions (e.g., all
actions between a log-in and a log-out of the system are a
session) and such sessions are logged for further investigation.
A session of length n ∈ N is a tuple s = (a1, . . . , an) with
ai ∈ A. In order to use the interactive visual interface to
incorporate security experts’ knowledge about the system, we
perform topic modeling on historical data of m ∈ N normal
behavior sessions H = {si, . . . , sm}. The resulting topics are
loaded into the visualization system. The security experts can
select a group of LDA topics and the medoid is highlighted for
further investigation. Topics can be added or removed based
on the experts’ judgment on whether they are representative
or not. By investigating the representativeness and coverage of
the whole dataset, the experts incorporate their knowledge into
the finally selected topics that divide the data H into clusters
for further modeling. As a result of this interaction we obtain
k ∈ N clusters Gi such that
⋃k
i=1 Gi = H.
After identifying the clusters of behavior, we train an OC-
SVM for each one. Formally, each OC-SVM describes a
function fi : An −→ R that predicts a score wi of the cluster
Gi for the input session s. During the prediction phase, we
compare the scores w1, . . . , wk predicted by the OC-SVMs,
finding maximal wmax denoting the matching cluster Gmax.
We employ LSTM-based language models for learning
behavioral patterns. A separate model is trained on each of
the clusters Gi. A language model assigns probability values to
sequences of words, analogously we want to assign probability
to a sequence of actions. Thus, if a model is trained on
normal behavior interactions suspicious behavior will have
a low probability. Formally, given an interaction of a user
with the system, the goal is to predict the likelihood of
an action ai given the previously observed actions in the
session a1, . . . , ai−1. A language model takes observed actions
a1, . . . , ai−1 as an input and predicts the probability distribu-
tion p = {p1, . . . , pd} over all the actions in A. The largest
probability pmax is considered to correspond to the next action
ai according to the model. For estimation of the normality of
a session s = (a1, . . . , an) we use the average probability
of the actually observed actions ai ∈ s, i.e, 1n
∑n
i=1 pai .
The prediction is performed with the model corresponding
to the cluster Gmax identified with OC-SVM. Kim et al. [5]
employed the cross-entropy loss −∑dj=1 yj log(pj), where y
is a probability distribution with 1 on the index j of the right
action, as an identification of an unlikely action (i.e., low loss
means that action is aligned with the behavior learned by the
model, while high loss can be interpreted as a warning to
further check the session). We are considering the average
loss over all the actions ai ∈ s in our experiments as well.
Next section describes our experiments setup and shows the
results of evaluation.
IV. EVALUATION
In the following we describe the experiments performed on
the data provided by the corporate partner in the DiSIEM
project. The evaluation is conducted with the aim of both
better understanding the system and particular properties of
interactions in it as well as to justify generality of the proposed
approach. The dataset does not include known misuses of the
system, so we validate our approach through (i) checking the
ability to model the existing behavior, (ii) creating random
sequences of actions and checking their normality, and (iii)
evaluating most suspicious sessions with the system experts.
A. Preparatory Evaluation
In order to better understand the system that produces the
logs we first give insights into the considered dataset. The
dataset was recorded for 31 days and consists of approximately
15000 sessions performed by 1400 users with almost 300
different actions [6]. Each session is a sequence of actions,
such as ’ActionSearchUser’, ’ActionDisplayUser’, etc. Since
we employ language modeling in our approach, the important
information is the lengths of the sequences. The histogram
of the lengths distribution can be seen in Figure 3. There is
some amount of long sessions, but it can be directly seen that
most of the sessions is less than 200 actions long. Indeed, the
percentile calculation has shown that 98% of sessions include
less than 91 actions and the average length of a session is 15.
Fig. 3. Lengths distribution of the sessions. The longest session consists of
more than 800 actions, while average length is 15.
This analysis allows to conclude that we can employ mini-
batch training for the language models (i.e., presenting several
examples to the network at one step of optimization) which is
an efficient way to achieve a faster convergence. The chosen
length of input sequences is 100, so more than 98% of sessions
can be learned fully. Each session then is presented as batch
of training data via a moving window of length 100, i.e. first
element of batch is filled with zeros in the beginning and first
action of the session in the end, while the last element of
batch includes all the actions of the session till the last. We
also eliminate the sessions consisting of less than two actions,
because then there is no observed and predicted part for the
model to learn.
Next step of the data transformation is to represent it in the
form that is suitable for the input to a LSTM network. We use
one-hot-encoding technique for it: every action is described
as a vector of length d in the form ai := [e1, . . . , ed] where
ej = 1 iff j == i and otherwise ej = 0. After padding and
cropping each sequence of actions in the dataset is represented
by a two-dimensional matrix 100×d. Every example is treated
like a sequence that should be continued, i.e., the model has
to predict which action follows it. Thus, an input example is
a 99-actions long sequence and output is the 100th action.
Learning a neural network requires identifying multiple
hyper parameters, such as amount of neurons per layer,
minibatch size most suitable for training, etc. We have chosen
an architecture of LSTM network, which consists of one layer
with LSTM units, a dropout layer [28] following it, and a
final dense layer with softmax activation for the prediction
of the next action in a sequence via probability distribution
over all possible actions. The evaluation was performed on a
small subset of the data and the final configuration looks as
following: 256 LSTM units followed by a dropout layer with
0.4 dropout rate should be trained with a minibatch size of
32 and a learning rate of 0.001. Since we considered the full
dataset for evaluation of hyper parameters it might happen that
additional reevaluation for each of the clusters can improve the
results. Nevertheless, this is left for the future exploration.
B. Clusters Identification
As described in Section III, multiple topic models are
learned on the sequences of users’ actions and the results
are loaded into the visual interactive system for security
experts analysis. This analysis on the considered dataset was
performed by the experts from the corporation owner of the
data. As a result, 13 clusters were identified, each carrying
particular semantic meaning. We performed frequent patterns
mining for the discovered clusters and found out that, for
example, one of them includes all the sessions with actions
to unlock user’s access to the system, another includes all
modifications of roles of users, third has all the actions con-
cerned with edition of office entities. That corresponds to the
intent to identify particular behavior clusters. For each of the
discovered clusters corresponding sessions were organized into
datasets, each dataset split into training, validation and testing
parts (in proportion 70/15/15). After modifications described
in Subsection IV-A both LSTM language models with pre-
evaluated hyper parameters and OC-SVMs were trained on
each of them.
In order to validate the diversity of the obtained models we
perform a simple test demonstrating the performance of the
cluster models. We calculate the accuracy (i.e., percentage of
correctly predicted actions) for each of the models first on
the testing set of the corresponding cluster and then on all
the others. The result is depicted in Figure 4. The clusters for
this experiment were ordered by their size in ascending order.
First conclusion that can be made from this plot is that larger
clusters produce much stronger models, e.g., performing good
on any cluster data, but nevertheless even very small clusters
(the smallest includes only 177 sessions) learn the prediction
task. Second conclusion supports the diversity of the models–
even the strongest models perform much better on their own
testing set than on average on the testing sets of all the other
clusters. Thus, we obtained specific models for each of the
semantically meaningfull clusters of behaviors.
Fig. 4. Comparison of the test accuracy of cluster models calculated on the
corresponding testing set against the average accuracy of the same model on
all the other testing sets.
After verifying the performance of the cluster models, our
next step is to compare them to baselines. As a very strong
baseline we selected a model trained on the whole dataset.
Comparing to this baseline, one should keep in mind that
overall in real datasets the amount of interaction sessions
is constantly growing–thus clusters can be made arbitrary
large making the corresponding models much stronger. And
as it was already grounded in Section III, global models
in cybersecurity with high probability will suffer from less
accurate fraud detection. The second baseline is a global model
trained on an arbitrary subset of the data of the same size as
the cluster dataset.
We analyze accuracy achieved on the testing sets for each of
the clusters. The result is plotted in Figure 5. The global model
(trained on cluster size data subset) baseline directly shows
that the knowledgeable identification of clusters is extremely
important for the approach. The accuracy of the models trained
on the arbitrary clusters of the same size cannot compete with
the performance of the cluster models when the size of data
is not large enough. Concerning the strong baseline we can
see the larger gap in performance for small clusters, but as
soon as the size is becoming sufficient for proper training
of the model, the performance is becoming as good or even
better (no matter that the largest cluster has only around 3500
examples compared to more than 10000 sequences for the
global model). A similar result in terms of loss values can be
found in Appendix VI.
Fig. 5. Clusters are organized in ascending order by size. The accuracy
achieved on the individual testing sets by the cluster model is compared to
the accuracy of the global model and global model trained on the subset of
the size equal to the cluster size.
C. Use Case: Online Regime
Having evaluated the performance of cluster models against
baselines, we move to the realtime use case. We want to
see how our approach works in the online regime, i.e., when
the session is analyzed in realtime, action by action in order
to give an alarm for security operators as soon as some
suspicious behavior is observed. For this we unite all the
testing datasets of the clusters and present it to the OC-SVMs
and corresponding models action by action. In the previous
experiments we were assuming that we know the cluster of
each session, while here we include OC-SVM prediction score
for identifying the most matching cluster.
Fig. 6. Development of scores predicted by OC-SVMs per action. We compare
the score predicted by the right OC-SVM, i.e., corresponding to the cluster
that the session really belongs to, against the maximal score among all the
OC-SVMs.
One of the insightful results of this experiment is concerned
with the predictions of OC-SVMs. The per action prediction
scores, averaged among all the testing sessions are shown in
Figure 6. We checked both the score of the OC-SVM that
should give the largest value, i.e., the OC-SVM corresponding
to the cluster of the session and the maximal achieved score
among all of them. One can directly see from the development
of scores an indication that all the sessions longer than the
average length are considered to be outliers by all the OC-
SVMs. This conclusion is supported by the wide use of
the OC-SVMs for outliers detection. In order to fight the
consequences of such behavior we propose to check the cluster
only during first 15 actions (as it was mentioned before,
average length of the session is 15) and then use the most
frequently assigned cluster as the predicted one for the session.
Fig. 7. Online regime of approach application. Average of likelihood for each
next action in each of the testing sessions is calculated for two baselines:
predicted on every step model, and predicted during first 15 actions model.
As a result of the use case we show scores development per
action performed during the session. By score here we mean
the probability of the action that really happened according to
the model prediction. The scores for all the testing sessions are
averaged. The plot for the two baselines is shown in Figure 7:
1) the predicted cluster model from the maximal OC-SVM
score,
2) the predicted cluster model from the first 15 predictions
of OC-SVM scores.
These baselines were selected as the ones that can be realisti-
cally used in real application. We restrict the sequence length
considered in the plot to 300 actions. We can observe that the
level of likelihood is rather stable for the first 100 actions, but
further on it decreases while variance increases considerably.
We also can see that proposed identification of cluster during
first actions leads to more stable development of the scores,
without significant drop in the beginning.
Thus, the use case indicated the usefulness of our approach
for online monitoring of interactions–as soon as predictions
start vary a lot or drop down considerably that is the alarm to
the security operator.
D. Evaluation of Normality Prediction
Finally we are evaluating how good our approach is capable
of identifying normality of an actions sequence. For this we
consider the average likelihood of each action in the session
as a normality measure of the session, as it was introduced in
Section III. We also consider average loss across a session to
estimate this normality measure as well. Here we summarize
the results across the clusters, separately calculated estimations
can be found in Appendix VI.
In our dataset we do not have sessions showing malicious
behavior, so in order to have a rough estimation of possible
results on outlying sessions we introduce an artificial test set.
This test set contains same amount of sessions as the main
data test set, each session has a randomly chosen length in
an interval [5, 25] and each action is randomly chosen from
the set of actions A. In order to evaluate normality of these
sessions, we employed our prediction pipeline.
Fig. 8. Normality estimation in terms of likelihood and average loss suffered
at each action in the session.
Figure 8 shows estimations made with average likelihood,
while Figure 9 shows average loss. As desired, the average
likelihood on the artificially generated test set is extremely low
(on the level of random prediction) and the average loss on
this dataset is almost twice higher than the average loss on the
real testing data. The difference in likelihood estimations of
normality is much more drastic than in terms of average loss.
But both of the metrics allow to directly distinguish between
the true test set and abnormal one.
Fig. 9. Normality estimation in terms of likelihood and average loss suffered
at each action in the session.
Finally, we also presented the most suspicious according to
our approach sessions to the system experts. According to their
specifications, such actions as ’ActionUnLockDisplayedUser’,
’ActionResetPwdUnlock’ or ’ActionDeleteUser’, i.e., active
modifications of existing user profiles, are most alarming.
Among top 20 sessions we found for example the following:
’ActionSearchUsr’, ’ActionWarningDeleteUser’, ’ActionDele-
teUser’, ’ActionCreateUser’, ’ActionCreateUser’, ’ActionCre-
ateUser’, ’ActionCreateUser’, ’ActionSearchUsr’, ’ActionUn-
LockUser’, ’ActionCreateUser’, ’ActionSearchOffice’, ’Ac-
tionDisplayOneOffice’, ’ActionDisplayDirectTFARule’. Such
sessions are exactly the ones that should give alarm notification
to the operators.
V. CONCLUSION
In our research we addressed the task of modeling behavior
during interactions with a system. We proposed a complex
approach consisting of identification of clusters of possible
behavior with involvement of the system security experts and
application of language modeling with LSTM networks for
learning the normal behavior. This modeling can afterwards
be employed to identify suspicious outlying sessions.
We evaluated our approach on a dataset provided by our
partner organization in the project DiSIEM. Since the dataset
contains only examples of normal behavior our main goal was
to model it. In the future we want to consider one of the
publicly available datasets (such as ADFA [29]) in order to
compare our approach to the others [2] and evaluate its ability
for identifying malicious behavior.
We can point out possible future directions for improving
and developing the proposed approach. First, weighted com-
bination of multiple scores from cluster models might give
more objective score, taking into account possible imprecision
of cluster identification. Second, identification of trends in the
development of the scores in order to set the alarm for security
operators can perform better than reacting to every low score
right away. Third, perplexity score might be more objective
normality measure of a session than the average per action
loss or likelihood.
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VI. APPENDIX
Per cluster evaluation in terms of loss values achieved by
models is shown in Figure 10.
Fig. 10. Clusters are organized in ascending order by size. The loss achieved
on the individual testing sets by the cluster model is compared to the loss of
the global model and global model trained on the subset of the size equal to
the cluster size.
Normality estimation of sessions was performed on the test
dataset for all the four considered previously baselines. The
result is depicted in Figure 11. We again can observe higher
normality scores for the stronger models trained on larger
clusters. Overall we can see that the identification of the cluster
model performs sufficiently well, and identification of the
cluster based on the first actions allows to avoid consequences
of OC-SVMs peculiarities.
Fig. 11. Normality estimation in terms of average likelihood of each action
in the session.
Other than average likelihood we considered average loss
suffered during each action prediction, following Kim et al.
[5]. The results are shown in Figure 12 and follow same pattern
as for average likelihood.
Fig. 12. Normality estimation in terms of average loss suffered at each action
in the session.
